Boulder's new election system has risks
Published in the Boulder Daily Camera, November 20,2014
Okay, I know ... we are done with the election, right? Yes, we are, and no more TV commercials, I promise. But last year Colorado revolutionized how we vote and, during this election, we found some bugs. Now's the time to talk about and fix them.
In 2013, Colorado switched to an election system where every active voter is automatically sent a ballot. The laudable goal of this change was to make it easier for voters to participate in elections and, in so doing, broaden the base of citizen engagement in the civic debate. Good stuff.
However, it's hard to make voting easier without making it more prone to fraud, and Colorado's change was no exception.
Colorado's risk of fraud begins with many ballots being sent to people who, regardless of their recent voting history, won't choose to vote in the election. For example, this year there were over 40,000 ballots sent out to Boulder County voters that were never returned. So these ballots spent two weeks sitting in peoples' inboxes and garbage cans just inviting others to fill them out and vote them, which is the textbook definition of voter fraud.
To stop this, we need to verify that the ballot submitted was voted by the person to whom the ballot was sent, which brings us to the problem - voter verification.
For mailed ballots, today's verification process relies primarily on one thing - the voter's signature on the envelope. Six years ago, most voters walked into a precinct, gave their ID to an election judge, and signed a form allowing signature verification. This is a very long way from what happens now.
Today, voter verification begins with two individuals from different parties sitting at a computer comparing a signature on a ballot envelope to a reference signature. If the signatures aren't close enough, the ballot is kicked up a level with more reference signatures to compare. If that's still not good enough, the ballots are sent to another more opaque level of review before contacting the voter and telling them to come in with ID if they want their vote to count.
This issue made headlines when the Boulder County Clerk would not allow election watchers to observe parts of the signature verification process. Additionally, Republican election watchers observed signature verifiers allowing ballots through when the signatures did not obviously match. Serious stuff.
Hearing this, I decided it was time to stop reading about it and go do it. So, I signed up to be an election judge and spent two days at the county clerk's office working with a delightful Democrat doing signature verification. My question - was this problem real or just political sniping?
What I concluded was that there are bugs in our system that need to be addressed or Colorado elections will see increasing voter fraud in years to come.
First, understand that human nature during signature verification is to accept the ballot, even when the signature match is sketchy - we all want the ballot to count. However, the quality of the reference signatures was often awful, thanks largely to the "motor voter" digital signatures that served as references. If we're going to rely exclusively on signatures for verification, the Counties need better reference signature data.
Second, the training we received as signature verifiers was far too limited. While we learned what to look for in a signature, we were never given guidelines as to "how close is close enough?" The signature verifiers need to receive better training and clearer standards.
Third, the political parties need to put energy into getting their A-team on-board as election judges and into the signature verification process. Relying on county clerks to find people from different parties for this job is not good enough.
Fourth, the signature verification process must be completely transparent. The election watchers who were there to ensure a fair election could not observe signature verification in any meaningful way. That must be fixed.
Finally, the sooner we move away from signatures into something less ambiguous - like fingerprints - the better.
None of these problems are unique to Boulder County. Hillary Hall, our county clerk, does a commendable job running a fair and inclusive election. These are problems with Colorado's new voting system as it now stands.
Voter fraud is not a big problem in Colorado today, but anyone who thinks it never could be is kidding themselves. What stops fraud is vigilance and attention to detail, and that is a fair price to pay for a more engaged electorate.
Okay, I know ... we are done with the election, right? Yes, we are, and no more TV commercials, I promise. But last year Colorado revolutionized how we vote and, during this election, we found some bugs. Now's the time to talk about and fix them.
In 2013, Colorado switched to an election system where every active voter is automatically sent a ballot. The laudable goal of this change was to make it easier for voters to participate in elections and, in so doing, broaden the base of citizen engagement in the civic debate. Good stuff.
However, it's hard to make voting easier without making it more prone to fraud, and Colorado's change was no exception.
Colorado's risk of fraud begins with many ballots being sent to people who, regardless of their recent voting history, won't choose to vote in the election. For example, this year there were over 40,000 ballots sent out to Boulder County voters that were never returned. So these ballots spent two weeks sitting in peoples' inboxes and garbage cans just inviting others to fill them out and vote them, which is the textbook definition of voter fraud.
To stop this, we need to verify that the ballot submitted was voted by the person to whom the ballot was sent, which brings us to the problem - voter verification.
For mailed ballots, today's verification process relies primarily on one thing - the voter's signature on the envelope. Six years ago, most voters walked into a precinct, gave their ID to an election judge, and signed a form allowing signature verification. This is a very long way from what happens now.
Today, voter verification begins with two individuals from different parties sitting at a computer comparing a signature on a ballot envelope to a reference signature. If the signatures aren't close enough, the ballot is kicked up a level with more reference signatures to compare. If that's still not good enough, the ballots are sent to another more opaque level of review before contacting the voter and telling them to come in with ID if they want their vote to count.
This issue made headlines when the Boulder County Clerk would not allow election watchers to observe parts of the signature verification process. Additionally, Republican election watchers observed signature verifiers allowing ballots through when the signatures did not obviously match. Serious stuff.
Hearing this, I decided it was time to stop reading about it and go do it. So, I signed up to be an election judge and spent two days at the county clerk's office working with a delightful Democrat doing signature verification. My question - was this problem real or just political sniping?
What I concluded was that there are bugs in our system that need to be addressed or Colorado elections will see increasing voter fraud in years to come.
First, understand that human nature during signature verification is to accept the ballot, even when the signature match is sketchy - we all want the ballot to count. However, the quality of the reference signatures was often awful, thanks largely to the "motor voter" digital signatures that served as references. If we're going to rely exclusively on signatures for verification, the Counties need better reference signature data.
Second, the training we received as signature verifiers was far too limited. While we learned what to look for in a signature, we were never given guidelines as to "how close is close enough?" The signature verifiers need to receive better training and clearer standards.
Third, the political parties need to put energy into getting their A-team on-board as election judges and into the signature verification process. Relying on county clerks to find people from different parties for this job is not good enough.
Fourth, the signature verification process must be completely transparent. The election watchers who were there to ensure a fair election could not observe signature verification in any meaningful way. That must be fixed.
Finally, the sooner we move away from signatures into something less ambiguous - like fingerprints - the better.
None of these problems are unique to Boulder County. Hillary Hall, our county clerk, does a commendable job running a fair and inclusive election. These are problems with Colorado's new voting system as it now stands.
Voter fraud is not a big problem in Colorado today, but anyone who thinks it never could be is kidding themselves. What stops fraud is vigilance and attention to detail, and that is a fair price to pay for a more engaged electorate.
